We examine cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves independently of non-members. This necessary condition for viability was proposed by Myerson [1977] and is modeled via an interaction graph G = (V, E); a coalition S ⊆ V is then viable if and only if the induced graph G[S] is connected. The non-emptiness of the core of a coalition game can be tested by a well-known covering LP. Moreover, the integrality gap of its dual packing LP defines exactly the multiplicative least-core and the relative cost of stability of the coalition game. This gap is upper bounded by the packing-covering ratio which, for graphical coalition games, is known to be at most the treewidth of the interaction graph plus one [Meir et al. 2013] .
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of cooperative game theory is the problem of how a group of agents should share the wealth that they collectively create. Its foremost concept is the core whose roots date back to Edgeworthian bargaining and cooperative improvement ([Edgeworth 1881] ; see also [Hildenbrand and Kirman 1988] ). It was first formalized by Gillies [1953 Gillies [ , 1959 via a coalition game G = (I, v) with a set I of agents and a valuation function v : 2 I → N. The core of the coalition game is the set of feasible solutions to:
i:i∈I
i:i∈S
Informally, we are allocating x i to agent i and v(S) represents the amount of wealth that the coalition S can generate by itself. Consequently, the coalition S will block any distribution scheme that does not allocate its members at least v(S) in total. Thus the wealth v(I) of the grand coalition must be distributed in such a fashion that no coalition wishes to block the allocation. The core is the set of vectors of payoffs that have this property - Bondareva [1963] and Shapley [1967] show that the core is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced.
This discussion immediately prompts two questions: (i) What processes enable the formation of coalitions? (ii) Even if coalitions can form and negotiate, do core solutions exist? Concerning the former question, it is unrealistic to assume that every subset of agents has the ability to act as a collective. Indeed, Myerson [1980] argued that feasible coalitions require structural properties that enable them to function. Clearly, one necessary property is that "communication" is possible between members of the coalition and Myerson [1977] formalized this ability using an interaction (communication) graph G = (I, E). Here a pair of agents induces an edge in G if they are able to interact and a coalition S is feasible if S induces a connected subgraph of G. Observe that two members of a feasible coalition do not need to be able to interact directly but they must be able to communicate indirectly via chains consisting of other members of the coalition. Thus, a coalition S is viable if and only if the induced subgraph G[S] is connected -in particular v(S) = 0 when G[S] is disconnected. Such graphical coalition games are the focus of this paper.
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For the latter question, the core is often empty. Indeed, it is straightforward to verify that the core of the game G is non-empty if and only if the following primal linear program has an optimal (fractional) solution whose value κ f (G) equals v(I).
Covering-LP: min i∈I x i s.t.
Interestingly, there is an elegant graphical characterization for when a graphical coalition game has a non-empty core for all possible valuation functions v. Namely, a graphical coalition game is strongly balanced if and only if the interaction graph G is a forest [Le Breton et al. 1992 ].
The Least-Core and the Relative Cost of Stability
Given the possible emptiness of the core, it is natural to consider solutions where the core constraints in this Covering-LP are relaxed. Specifically, for each feasible coalition S, given α ≥ 1, there is a constraint α · i:i∈S x i ≥ v(S). These constraints imply that a coalition S will not block an allocation unless it can unilaterally improve its total wealth by more than an α factor. The set of feasible solutions then form the α-core. The minimum α for which the α-core is non-empty arises when α * = κ f (G)
v(I) . The α * -core is called the (multiplicative) least-core. 3 Moreover, we can also determine the least-core by considering the dual of the primal linear program.
Packing-LP: max S:S⊆I v(S) · y S s.t.
S⊆I:i∈S y S ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I y S ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ I Let ρ f (G) be the optimal fractional solution to this Packing-LP, and let ρ(G) be the optimal integral solution. Then α * is exactly equal to the dual integrality gap
ρ(G) . To verify this, observe that ρ f (G) = κ f (G) = α * · v(I), by strong duality. But the optimal integral solution to the dual has value ρ(G) = v(I); simply set y I = 1 and y S = 0 for every S = I. Here we are making the standard assumption in the literature that, for any coalition game, the valuation function v is superadditive. 4 In particular, this property reflects the simple observation that any collective has the option to voluntarily partition itself into subgroups to generate wealth. Thus,
. This paper will study least-cores in coalition games over interaction graphs. Interestingly, multiplicative least-cores are equivalent to the concept of the relative cost of stability. Bachrach et al. [2009b] asked how much it would cost (an external authority) to stabilize a coalition game; i.e. what is the minimum total payment required such that no coalition can benefit by blocking the allocation. The relative cost of stability [Meir et al. 2011 ] is then defined to be the ratio between this minimum payment and the total wealth the grand coalition can generate, namely
v(I) = α * . Thus, the relative cost of stability is also given by the dual integrality gap.
It is informative to give practical interpretations of the integral and fractional packing numbers. Suppose there is a one unit interval of time, and at any point in time an agent can choose to work for any coalition it belongs to. Thus, each agent partitions the interval into sub-intervals associated with assorted coalitions. Now consider two different determinants for whether a coalition is productive. First, suppose that a coalition can only function if its members meet together -thus the coalition can generate wealth only if its members are working for it simultaneously. In this setting, at any point in time t, the functioning coalitions are disjoint. It then follows, by superadditivity, that it is best if the grand coalition meets at time t. Since this argument holds for any t, the optimal solution is that the grand coalition meet for the entire unit of time (i.e., each agent contributes all its time to the grand coalition). Thus, we obtain the integral packing solution ρ(G). Second, instead suppose that it is not necessary for a coalition to convene simultaneously. The productivity of a coalition is then determined by the minimum time contribution of one of its members. So coalition members may work at different times and, in this setting, it is possible that more wealth can be generated if the agents fractionally allocate their time amongst multiple coalitions. Indeed the optimal solution now is the fractional packing solution ρ f (G).
Our Results
So to develop an understanding of coalition games, we must study the primal and dual linear programs. In particular, we will focus on the graphical coalition games of Myerson [1977] . Specifically, we are interested in how the primal and dual integrality gaps vary with the topology of the interaction graph.
As inferred by our nomenclature, the primal and dual form a pair of packing and covering linear programs. Thus a natural starting point is to consider the packingcovering ratio of a game G; this is the ratio
between the values of the optimal integral solutions to the primal κ(G) and the dual ρ(G). Observe that, by strong duality, the packing-covering ratio is the product of the primal integrality gap
and the dual integrality gap G) . Consequently, the packing-covering ratio trivially upper bounds both integrality gaps. Packing-covering ratios have been studied extensively in graph theory. Special attention has focused on problems with the Erdős-Pósa property, where the ratio is a function of the packing number and is otherwise independent of the graph. Interestingly, whilst graphical coalition games do not have the Erdős-Pósa property, the packing-covering ratio can be bounded by an important parameter of the interaction graph, namely, treewidth. Indeed, Meir et al. [2013] proved that, for any valuation function (game G) over an interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio is at most the treewidth ω(G) plus one.
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We extend the work of Meir et al. in several ways. First, we show that structurally treewidth is not the most appropriate invariant in understanding the packing-covering ratio. The topological parameter that corresponds exactly to the packing-covering ratio is a concept we term the thicket number of the graph. Specifically, in Section 3, we show that for every coalition game G over a graph G the packing-covering ratio is at most the thicket number, τ (G), of the graph. Conversely, for every graph G there exists a coalition game G for which the packing-covering ratio is at least the thicket number. THEOREM 1.1. For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio satisfies:
Observe that, in order to concisely formulate our results, we use the notation ≤ ∃ and ≤ ∀ . Here ≤ ∃ means that there exists a game G over the interaction graph G such that the inequality is satisfied, and ≤ ∀ means that for every game G over G the inequality is satisfied.
6 Theorem 1.1 relies on a graphical minmax result that we prove in Section 2. Specifically, we show that thickets have a dual notion called vine decompositions. These decompositions can be viewed as a "thin" relative of tree decompositions. In particular, the vinewidth of a graph is at most the treewidth plus one, and is typically smaller.
In principle, the primal and dual integrality gaps could be much less than the thicket number. However, we prove the thicket number is (approximately) the correct measure for these integrality gaps as well. Specifically, in Section 6 we prove THEOREM 1.2. For any interaction graph G, the primal integrality gap satisfies:
Interestingly, unlike for the packing-covering ratio, the upper and lower bounds cannot be closed completely for the primal integrality gap. Indeed, for any graph G there is a constant
However a G really does vary with the graph. In particular, we show that a G → 1 for the family of graphs that correspond to the powers of paths. On the other hand, we prove that a G ≤ 1 2 for cliques. It follows that the constant 1 in the upper bound in Theorem 1.2 cannot be decreased, whilst the constant in the lower bound cannot be increased above 1 2 . Next consider the dual integrality gap. In Section 5 we prove THEOREM 1.3. There exist c and δ such that for any interaction graph G, the dual integrality gap satisfies:
Again, it is not possible to close the upper and lower bounds for the dual integrality gap completely. Even more interestingly, the polynomial range between the upper and lower bounds is necessary. This is since for the family of grid graphs, the exponent of τ (G) in the lower bound must be 1, whereas for the family of cliques the exponent of τ (G) in the upper bound is 1 2 . It follows that the exponent 1 in the upper bound of Theorem 1.3 cannot be decreased, whilst the exponent δ in the lower bound cannot be increased above 1 2 . We remark that the value of δ in Theorem 1.3 relies on the existence of a grid minor of polynomial size in the treewidth of the graph, a deep result of Chekuri and Chuzhoy [2014] . Determining the best possible order of the polynomial in the lower bound of Theorem 1.3 (between δ and 1 2 ) is an interesting open question. Finally, in Section 4, we show how the VC-dimension of the interaction graph may also be used to bound the packing-covering ratio and the integrality gaps. Given our previous discussion, the resultant bounds must be weaker than those obtainable via the thicket number. Indeed, we show how these VC-dimension bounds may can be derived from the thicket number bounds. 6 We remark that inequalities of the form ≥ ∃ and ≥ ∀ are not interesting from a game-theoretic perspective.
Indeed, for any graph G, we have that
≥ ∀ 1, by weak duality. Furthermore, the packing-covering ratio of any coalition game with one viable coalition trivially equals 1.
THICKETS AND VINES
Recall that Meir et al. [2013] show that the packing-covering ratio can be bounded in terms of the treewidth of the interaction graph G. To understand this, we begin with a brief review of treewidth. We will then introduce a better fitting parameter for analyzing coalition games.
Tree Decompositions and Brambles
Treewidth provides a measure of how closely a graph shares some structural separation properties possessed by trees. Formally, given an undirected graph G = (V, E) we may represent it by a tree T = (N, L) and a labeling : N → 2 V . 7 The labeling assigns to each node t ∈ T a subset (t) = V t of vertices of G. For each v ∈ V we denote by T v the set of nodes in T for which v is included in the label, i.e. T v = {t : v ∈ V t }. We say that a tree and labeling, (T, ), is a tree decomposition of G if: (i) For each vertex v of G, the set T v is a non-empty and connected subgraph of T .
(ii) For each edge e = (u, v) in G, the subtrees T u and T v intersect in T .
The width of a tree decomposition (T, ) of G is the size of the largest label of a node in T minus one.
8 The treewidth, ω(G), is the minimum width of a tree decomposition of G. Meir et al. [2013] show that treewidth relates to coalition games via the following bound.
THEOREM 2.1. [Meir et al. 2013 ] For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio satisfies:
To delve further into this topic, it is important to note that there are combinatorial structures called brambles that provide a dual notion for tree decompositions. A bramble is a collection F = {F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F p } of sets such that: (i) Each F i ⊆ V induces a connected subgraph of G, and (ii) Every pair F i and F j in F either intersect (share a vertex) or are adjacent (there is an edge with one endpoint in F i and one endpoint in F j ). The hitting size β(F) of a bramble F is the minimum size of a subset of vertices that intersects each set F i in F. The bramble number β(G) = max F β(F) is the maximum hitting size of any bramble in G. Seymour and Thomas [1993] proved the following minmax theorem: THEOREM 2.2. [Seymour and Thomas 1993] The bramble number β(G) is equal to the treewidth ω(G) − 1.
Brambles (rather than tree decompositions) directly relate to coalition games. Moreover, the relationship is actually through combinatorial structures we call thickets.
Thickets
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph. A thicket H = {H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H p } is a collection of sets such that: (i) Each H i ⊆ V induces a connected subgraph of G, and (ii) Every pair H i and H j in H intersects.
Observe that thickets differ from brambles in that they must pairwise intersectadjacency is not sufficient. The hitting size τ (H) of a thicket H is the minimum size of a vertex set that intersects each set H i in H. The thicket number τ (G) = max H τ (H) is the maximum hitting size of any thicket in G.
Intuitively, thickets are indeed the objects that directly correspond to the packingcovering ratio. The packing number of a thicket H is exactly one, but its covering number is τ (H). We will formalize this intuition in Section 3. First, let's see three simple classes of graphs that will illustrate the concept of thickets, and which will also be very useful in the technical results that follow.
Example 1: Trees. Let G = T n be a tree on n vertices. A thicket H = {H 1 , . . . , H p } on T n then consists of a collection of pairwise intersecting subtrees. It is well-known, by the Helly Property of trees, that such a collection must contain a common vertex. Thus the thicket number, τ (T n ), of a tree T n is at most 1.
Example 2: Cliques. Let G = K n be a clique on n vertices. A thicket H = {H 1 , . . . , H p } on K n then consists of a collection of pairwise intersecting subcliques. Suppose the smallest of these cliques, say H 1 , has cardinality at most 1 2 n . Then, as H 1 itself intersects all of the sets in H, we have a hitting set of cardinality Example 3: Grids. Let G = R k be a k × k grid graph -the planar graph formed by a grid of k rows and k columns. Consider the thicket H defined as follows. We have a set H R,C = R ∪ C, for each row R and each column C in the grid. Clearly each set is connected. Moreover, each pair of sets intersect. So H is a thicket. Now take any vertex set X of cardinality less than k − 1. Since there are k rows, X must miss some rowR; similarly it must miss some columnĈ. Hence, X is not a hitting set for H as it does not intersect HR ,Ĉ . So the hitting size τ (H) is at least k. Consequently, the thicket number, τ (R k ), of the grid R k is at least k.
Vine Decompositions
Brambles are dual to tree decompositions, and thickets also have dual structures. Since the definition of a thicket is more stringent than that of a bramble, it must be the case that the definition of its dual structures is more relaxed than that of a tree decomposition. In particular, its dual will be a thin tree (let's call it a vine!).
Formally, given an undirected graph G = (V, E), we construct a (vine) tree T = (N, L). The labeling assigns to each node t ∈ T a subset (t) = V t of vertices of G. For each v ∈ V we denote by T v the set of nodes in T for which v is included in the label, i.e. T v = {t : v ∈ V t }. We say that a tree and labeling, (T, ), is a vine decomposition of G if:
(i) For each vertex v of G, the set T v is a non-empty and connected subgraph of T .
(ii) For each edge e = (u, v) in G, the subtrees T u and T v intersect or are adjacent in T .
The width of a vine decomposition (T, ) of G is the size of the largest label of a node in T . The vinewidth, ν(G), is the minimum width of a vine decomposition of G. The main structural result of the paper is that the thicket number τ (G) is equal to the vinewidth ν(G). Before proving this result in Section 2.4, we will develop some understanding of vine decompositions. First, let's return to the simple examples of trees, cliques and grids.
Example 1: Trees. Observe that a tree G = T n gives a trivial vine decomposition of itself, that is T = (T n , ) where (v) = {v}. This is a vine decomposition as for each edge (u, v) in G the two vertices are clearly still adjacent in T . Thus the vinewidth of a tree is at most 1.
Example 2: Cliques. Let G = K n be a clique on n vertices. The clique has vinewidth at most 1 2 n . The corresponding vine decomposition has two nodes, each containing (roughly) half the vertices. This is a vine decomposition as for each edge (u, v) in G the two vertices are either in the same node of T or in adjacent nodes.
Example 3: Grids. Let G be a k × k grid graph. Let the (vine) tree T be a path on k nodes. Let the ith node in the path satisfy (i) = C i , where C i is the set of vertices in the ith column of G. This is a vine decomposition. For each v ∈ V the set T v is a singleton node in T , and is thus non-empty and connected. For each edge e = (u, v) in G, either T u = T v if u and v are in the same column of G, or T u and T v are adjacent nodes in T if u and v are in the same row of G. Clearly the width of this vine decomposition is k and, thus, the vinewidth ν(G) is at most k. Now treewidth and vinewidth are at most a multiplicative factor two apart. THEOREM 2.3. Vinewidth and treewidth are related by ν(G)−1 ≤ ω(G) ≤ 2ν(G)−1. Moreover there exist graphs for which the lower and upper bounds are tight.
PROOF. Observe that a tree decomposition of G is a vine decomposition of G. Thus, ν(G) ≤ ω(G)+1. Note that this bound is almost tight for the grid R k ; we have ν(R k ) = k (this follows as the thicket number equals the vinewidth (see Theorem 2.5 below)) and it is well-known that ω(R k ) = k. In fact, graphs can be constructed for which this lower bound is exactly tight; we omit the details.
On the other hand, given a vine decomposition (T, ), we can create a treedecomposition (T ,ˆ ) by augmenting it as follows. We replace each link in T by a path of length two inT . For each new node t ∈T in the middle of the path that replaced the link (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ T we setˆ (t) = (t 1 ) ∪ (t 2 ). It is easy to verify that this is a treedecomposition. Furthermore the width of this tree-decomposition is at most 2ν(G) − 1 (since each label has size at most 2ν(G)). This upper bound is tight for cliques as K n has treewidth n − 1 and vinewidth n 2 .
As with tree decompositions, an important property of vine decompositions is that nodes in the (vine) tree correspond to separators 9 in the original graph.
LEMMA 2.4. Let (T, ) be a vine decomposition of G, and let t be an internal node in T . Then V t is a separator in G.
PROOF. Take any node t ∈ T with degree r ≥ 2. Let T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T r be the subtrees formed by the removal of t. Let C i = s∈Ti V s \ V t . We claim that there is no edge between C i and C j for i = j in G \ V t . To see this, take any pair of vertices x ∈ C i and y ∈ C j where i = j. Since neither x nor y are in V t their corresponding subtrees T x and T y can neither intersect nor be adjacent in T , because T x ⊆ T i and T y ⊆ T j . Thus (x, y) is not an edge of G.
The Thicket-Vinewidth Duality Theorem
Here we present the thicket-vinewidth duality theorem. THEOREM 2.5. The thicket number τ (G) is equal to the vinewidth ν(G).
To prove this we apply the approach used by Seymour and Thomas [1993] to bound the bramble number. In particular we prove the following stronger result, which characterizes when a thicket can be extended to create a thicket with hitting size k.
LEMMA 2.6. For any thicket H in G, exactly one of the following holds:
(a) There is a thicket H with hitting size k such that H ⊆ H . (b) There is a vine decomposition (T, ) of G such that for any node s ∈ T with |V s | ≥ k: (i) s is a leaf in T , and (ii) V s is not a hitting set for H.
Before proving Lemma 2.6, let's see why it does give Theorem 2.5.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.5. First we show that ν(G) ≥ τ (G). Take a thicket H = {H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H p } and a vine decomposition T = (N, L) of G. We will show the subtrees T [H i ] of T corresponding to each element H i of H pairwise intersect. We then apply the Helly Property to find a common intersection node for all the T [H i ], and show that the label of this node induces a hitting set for H.
More precisely, as H i is a connected subgraph of G, there is a tree R i in G spanning the vertices of H i . Now consider the subgraph of T induced by H i ; that is T [H i ] = w∈Hi T w . We claim that T [H i ] is a tree (i.e., T [H i ] is connected). Take any edge (v r , v s ) ∈ R i . As T is vine decomposition, we have that T vr ∪ T vs induces a connected subtree in T . Extending this argument over every edge of R i implies T [H i ] is connected. Now take any pair H i and H j in H, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ p. Since H is a thicket they both contain some vertex u in G. It follows that 
We claim that the vertex set V t in G is a hitting set for H. To see this, take any H i ∈ H. We have t ∈ T [H i ] and, thus, there is some
, the thicket number is at most the vinewidth: τ (G) ≤ ν(G).
Next we must prove that ν(G) ≤ τ (G). This follows from Lemma 2.6. To see this, let H = ∅ be the empty thicket and k = ν(G). Then either (a) there is a thicket H with hitting size k or (b) there is a vine decomposition (T, ) such that if |V s | ≥ k then s is a leaf in T and V s is not a hitting set for H. If (a) holds, then H is a thicket of hitting size ν(G) and so, by definition of τ (G), we have τ (G) ≥ ν(G). We now show (b) cannot hold. For all s, V s is a hitting set since H is empty. Thus we have this restatement of (b):
there is a vine decomposition (T, ) such that |V s | < k for all s ∈ T , i.e. the vinewidth is at most k − 1 = ν(G) − 1, a contradiction to the definition of ν(G).
So now we must prove Lemma 2.6. Our proof is based upon an interpretation by Reed [2002] of the bramble-treewidth duality theorem. Before proving Lemma 2.6, let us state two lemmas. LEMMA 2.7. Given a thicket H with hitting size h. Let X 1 and X 2 be hitting sets for H. Then any separator for X 1 and X 2 contains at least h vertices. PROOF. Take a set H i ∈ H. The set H i is connected and intersects X 1 and X 2 at v 1 and v 2 , respectively. Thus there is a path P i in H i between the v 1 and v 2 . A set S that separates X 1 and X 2 must disconnect this path. This applies for every set H i ∈ H, so S must hit every set in H and is, thus, a hitting set. Therefore |S| ≥ h. We remark that, in fact, there are h vertex disjoint paths from X 1 to X 2 in G.
LEMMA 2.8. Let (T ,ˆ ) be a vine decomposition of G. Let X be a separator of G with a component C of G \ X. Suppose there is a node t ∈T such thatV t ∩ C = ∅ and every separator for X andV t contains at least |X| vertices. Then there is a vine decomposition
Lemma 2.8 allows us to restrict any vine decomposition on G to one on a subset of the vertices of G that contains a special label. This subset is the union of a cutset X and a component C of G − X. The special label is X.
PROOF. Let A and B be two subsets of vertices. Menger's theorem ensures that the maximum number of internally vertex disjoint paths from A to B is equal to the minimum size of a separator for A and B. Thus, there are |X| = k vertex disjoint paths fromV r to X. Let these paths be {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k } where the endpoint of P i in X is x i . BecauseV t is disjoint from C, it follows that all the P i are also disjoint from C. Now consider the vine treeT . Let Q i be the path inT fromT xi to t (not including vertices ofT xi ). We claim the desired vine decomposition (T =T , ) on G[X ∪C] is given by taking
Note that s ∈ Q i if and only if P i intersectsV s because the node s separatesV xi from t inT (indeed, the union of theT u for all u ∈ P i is a connected subgraph ofT , indeed otherwise the subtreesT u andT v would not be incident inT for an edge (u, v) of P i , a contradiction with the definition of vine-tree decomposition). Now, first let's verify that this is a vine decomposition on G[X ∪ C]. Take any vertex v ∈ C. Then T v =T v , a subtree of T =T . On the other hand, take any vertex x i ∈ X. Then T xi =T xi ∪ Q i which, again, is a subtree of T =T since by construction Q i is a path from t to a vertex incident toT xi . Furthermore, for any edge (u, v) in G[X ∪ C] we know thatT u andT v either intersect or are adjacent inT . Therefore, T u and T v either intersect or are adjacent in T =T since T u containsT u and T v containsT v . Thus we have a vine decomposition. Now let's show that the three required properties hold.
(1) Each path Q i ends in t. Thus, we have x i ∈ V t . SinceV t is disjoint from C, we obtain V t = X. (2) Take a leaf s = t of T . The paths Q i do not contain leaves and so V s ⊆V s . (3) Take a non-leaf s of T . If P i intersectsV s then we have x i ∈ V s . Suppose x i / ∈V s . But then there is a y i ∈ P i ∩V s where y i = x i . By disjointness, y i is not in P j for any j = i. Moreover y i is not in C since P i is disjoint from C. Hence, y i ∈V s \ V s . It follows that |V s | ≤ |V s |.
We now have all the tools we need to prove Lemma 2.6. PROOF OF LEMMA 2.6. Assume (b) holds. So suppose there is a vine decomposition where any node s ∈ T with |V s | ≥ k is a leaf and does not provide a hitting set for H. For every H ⊆ H , the set V s is not a hitting set for H either. But, as we saw when proving that ν(G) ≥ τ (G) in the proof of Theorem 2.5, the vine decomposition must contain a node t that provides a hitting set V t for H . But, by (ii), such a node has |V t | < k. Thus, H is a thicket with hitting size at most k − 1, and then (a) does not hold.
We must now show that at least one of (a) or (b) holds. We prove this by contradiction. In particular, take a counter-example H with the fewest number of hitting sets of size at most k − 1.
Since (a) does not hold, every thicket H containing H has hitting size at most k − 1. In particular, H itself has at least one hitting set X of cardinality at most k − 1. By assumption, no vine decomposition exists with property (b). Hence, X = V (G) otherwise the trivial vine decomposition with a single node labelled V (G) satisfies (b). Now let {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r } be the connected components of G\X. We will find vine decompositions i by merging together all the t i into a single node whose label is the union of the labels of the merged nodes. Observe that this will create a vine decomposition T for G satisfying (i) and (ii). The theorem then follows. So we need to show that (1) and (2) 
First suppose C i does not intersect some thicket element H i in H. Then we can define T i to be a tree with two nodes s and t i , where V Therefore, we may assume that C i is a hitting set for H. By the connectedness of C i , we have thatĤ = H ∪ {C i } is also a thicket. Since (a) does not hold for H, we know thatĤ has a hitting set of size at most k − 1. Moreover, X is not a hitting set forĤ since X is disjoint from C i . ThusĤ has fewer hitting sets of size at most k − 1 than H. Consequently,Ĥ is not a counterexample. But (a) cannot hold forĤ otherwise it holds for H ⊂Ĥ, a contradiction. Hence (b) holds forĤ.
So take a vine decomposition (T ,ˆ ) of G satisfying (b) forĤ. There must be a leaf t ∈T with |V t | ≥ k such thatV t is a hitting set for H, andV t ∩ C i = ∅. If not, (T ,ˆ ) is a vine decomposition of G satisfying (b) with respect to H, contradicting the definition of G. We will transformT into a vine decomposition for G[X ∪ C i ] satisfying both (1) and (2). Recall X is a minimum hitting set for H. Furthermore,V t is a hitting set for H. Thus, by Lemma 2.7, every separator for X andV t contains at least |X| vertices. Therefore, we may apply Lemma 2.8 with C = C i , t = t to give a vine decomposition of G[X ∪ C i ]. This vine decomposition satisfies (1) and (2). To see (1), note that t i is a leaf with V i ti = X. Now |V 
THE PACKING-COVERING RATIO
In this section, we prove that the packing-covering ratio is given exactly by the thicket number of the interaction graph (Theorem 1.1). To prove this, let's consider the lower and upper bounds separately. THEOREM 3.1. For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio satisfies
. . , H p } be a thicket with maximum hitting size τ (G). We define a game G using the following valuation function:
Recall each set H i ∈ H is connected. Thus v is a valid valuation function for a coalition game over the interaction graph G. Furthermore, the sets {H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H p } are pairwise-intersecting. Thus any partition S of the agents can include at most one set from H. So ρ(G) = 1. On the other hand, with integral payoffs, we must provide a dollar to at least one agent in each coalition in H. The cheapest way to do this is to give a dollar to each agent in a minimum hitting set for H. Thus κ(G) = τ (H) = τ (G) and the packing-covering ratio is exactly τ (G).
THEOREM 3.2. For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio satisfies
PROOF. Take any game G with valuation function v over an interaction graph G. Let T = (N, L) be a vine decomposition of G. We may assume each label in the vine decomposition has size τ (G); if not, simply add vertices from the labels of adjacent nodes. Root the (vine) tree T at an arbitrary node r. In turn, we may now consider each subtree of T to be rooted at its (unique) node closest to the root r. We claim that, for each coalition Q, the nodes T (Q) = v∈Q T v induce a connected graph in T . Indeed, by viability of the coalition, we know G[Q] is connected. Thus, for every edge (u, v) in the subtree G[Q], we have that T u ∪ T v is connected, by definition of a vine decomposition. Then, since connectivity is transitive, T (Q) induces a subtree in T .
Hence, we may define the root of a coalition, t Q , to be the root of T (Q). We are ready now to describe a payment allocation x that proves the theorem. To simplify the analysis, instead of allocating values to agents directly, we have an allocation x i,t for each agent i and each node t in T v . The total allocation for agent i is then simply x i = t∈Ti x i,t . We work bottom-up from the leaves to the root, and allocate to all vertices in a label (t) in turn. At a node t, for each coalition Q whose root is t, we compute the total amount x(Q, t) allocated to Q in descendants of t and the residual value r(Q, t) = max(v(Q) − x(Q, t), 0) we still need to add to Q to create a valid allocation. If Q * t is the coalition of maximum residual value, we set x v,t = r(Q By the choice of Q * t , we can conclude (simply by looking only at allocations for t and its descendants) that x(Q) ≥ v(Q), for every coalition Q with root t. Furthermore, if r(Q * t ) is positive then x(Q * ) = v(Q * ). Thus, since every coalition has a root, x(Q) ≥ v(Q) for every feasible coalition Q. Now let's bound the total cost of the allocation. By construction, the cost of our allocation is t r(Q * t , t) · | (t)|. Therefore, since all labels have size | (t)| = τ (G), we have that κ(G) ≤ τ (G) · t r(Q * t , t). Therefore, it suffices to prove that t r(Q * t , t) ≤ ρ(G). To do this we construct an integral packing Q of coalitions as follows. Consider the nodes of T from root to leaves (in a postorder traversal). Initially no node is marked as deleted. At a node t of T , if t is not marked as deleted and the residual r(Q * t , t) is positive, add Q * t to Q and mark all nodes in T (Q * t ) as deleted. Otherwise, mark t as deleted. We bound the packing value of Q inductively using a potential function. This potential is defined as the total allocation in remaining nodes (i.e., nodes that are not marked as deleted). Initially this potential is τ (G) · t r(Q * t , t). When we add an element to Q the potential drops by
, whilst the value of the packing Q increases by v(Q * t ). The potential never changes otherwise. By the end, every node is marked as deleted. Consequently, our potential function is zero and, so, the value of our packing has increased by exactly
. Thus Q has the desired value. It remains to verify the coalitions in Q are disjoint. So take any two coalitions, say Q * t1 and Q * t2 . If t 1 and t 2 do not form an ancestor-descendant pair in T then Q * t1 and Q * t2 are disjoint since the nodes containing vertices of Q * t1 are in the tree rooted in t 1 while those of Q * t2 are in the tree rooted in t 2 . So, without loss of generality, assume that t 2 is an ancestor of t 1 . It follows that t 1 / ∈ T (Q * t2 ), otherwise Q * t1 would not have been selected. Thus Q * t1 and Q * t2 are again disjoint.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion on computational implications. Computing the treewidth of a graph G is an NP-hard problem [Arnborg et al. 1987] . Whilst no formal proof is given here, the NP-completeness arguments can be extended to vinewidth. The existence of a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the treewidth running in polynomial time remains an important open problem. There does, however, exist a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the treewidth in FPT time, parameterized by the treewidth [Bodlaender 1988 ]. Since, by Theorem 2.3, the vinewidth is within a factor two of the treewidth, this provides a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the vinewidth of the graph.
VC-DIMENSION
A ubiquitous measure of the complexity of a set-family is its VC-dimension [Vapnik and Chervonenkis 1971] . As we have a set-family derived from the interaction graph G, it is natural to ask whether we can relate the packing-covering ratio to the VCdimension. We explore this question in this section. However we will show that the results that can be obtained using the VC-dimension are weaker than the ones that can be obtained using the vine-width.
First, recall the definition of VC-dimension. Given a ground set I and a collection R = {R 1 , . . . , R m } of subsets of I, we say that X ⊆ I is shattered by R if, for all Y ⊆ X, there exists some R j ∈ S such that Y = X ∩ R j . The VC-dimension of (I, R) is then the maximum cardinality of a shattered set.
Interestingly, for any set-family, in a simple game 10 the primal integrality gap can also be upper bounded by the VC-dimension. Specifically, THEOREM 4.1. [Haussler and Welzl 1986 ] Let R be a set-family with VCdimension d. Then the primal integrality gap of any simple game G whose viable coalitions are R satisfies
We can strengthen this result when the family of coalitions is induced by an interaction graph G = (V, E). In particular, let the graphical set family S = {S 1 , . . . , S r } of G be the set of all connected induced subgraphs of G. We then define the VC-dimension of the graph G to be the VC-dimension of the graphical set family of G.
THEOREM 4.2. Let G be a graph with VC-dimension d. Then, restricting to simple games, the packing-covering ratio satisfies
PROOF. Let G be a coalition game over interaction graph G. Let R be the set of coalitions of G. Note that R is a subset for the graphical set family S of G. Let X be a minimum hitting set of R. We want to show that ρ(G) ≥ 1 d+1 · |X|. Now, by the minimality of X, there is a justifying coalition R x ∈ R for each vertex x ∈ X; specifically, there exists a coalition R x such that R x ∩ X = {x}. Let J ⊆ R be the set of justifying coalitions. So |J | = |X|.
First, assume there is a set R * ∈ J that intersects k of the other justifying coalitions. Let J = {R x1 , . . . , R x k } be the collection of k justifying coalitions that intersect R * . We now show X = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is shattered for the graphical set family S. We claim that for any Y ⊆ X , the set R = R * ∪ x∈Y R x intersects X in exactly Y . The set R is connected since every R x is connected and, by construction, each of them intersects the connected set R * . Thus R is in the graphical set family S and is connected. Since R * ∩ X is empty, we have R ∩ X = Y , as desired. So X can be shattered (for the graphical set family S), and thus k ≤ d since the VC-dimension of G is at most d.
Consequently, we may assume that every set J intersects at most d of the other justifying coalitions. Then we can easily obtain a disjoint packing of 1 d+1 · |X| coalitions in J . Simply select any coalition R in J ; then remove R and the (at most) d coalitions it intersects from J , and recurse. The theorem follows.
But we have already seen that the thicket number gives the packing-covering ratio exactly. Thus we should be able to upper bound the thicket number of any graph by a function of the VC-dimension. Indeed this is the case. PROOF. Let H = {H 1 , . . . , H p } be a thicket with hitting number τ (G), and let X be a minimum hitting set for H. We claim that X is shattered. To see this take any x ∈ X. There exists some justifying set H x ∈ H such that H x ∩ X = {x}, otherwise X is not minimal. Now take any Y ⊆ X. Without loss of generality, let Y = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x r }. Now each H xi induces a connected graph. Moreover, the sets H xi pairwise-intersect. Thus W = ∪ r i=1 H xi also induces a connected graph. Therefore W is in the graphical set family S. Since H x1 ∩ X = {x i } we have that
Combining Theorem 4.3 with Theorem 1.1, we obtain the following strengthening of Theorem 4.2, which also applies to non-simple games.
COROLLARY 4.4. Let G be a graph with VC-dimension d. Then the packing-covering ratio satisfies
Of course, Corollary 4.4 must give a weaker bound than Theorem 1.1. Indeed, the VCdimension of a graph G can be arbitrarily larger than its thicket number. To see this, consider a star graph with n edges. Since a star is a tree, the vinewidth of G is equal to 1 by Theorem 2.3. But the VC-dimension of the star is n since any subset of leaves of the star can be shattered using the graphical set family of G.
THE DUAL INTEGRALITY GAP
We now consider the integrality gaps of the primal and dual linear programs. Clearly, these gaps are at most the packing-covering ratio, and thus at most the thicket number τ (G). It is conceivable, however, that the integrality gaps could be much smaller than the thicket number. In Section 6 we will consider the primal integrality gap. In this section, we examine the dual integrality gap. This gap determines the multiplicative least-core and measures the relative cost of stability. Moreover, recall the practical interpretation of the fractional packing number given in Section 1.1. An agent may fractionally allocate one unit of time amongst the coalitions it belongs to, and each coalition generates wealth in proportion to the minimum amount of time one of its members allocates to it. The main result of this section is then the following:
THEOREM 5.1. There exist constants c, δ > 0 such that for any interaction graph G, the dual integrality gap satisfies:
The upper bound follows from Theorem 1.1. Thus it remains for us to prove the lower bound. To do this, we will apply some important results from graph minor theory. A graph H is a minor of a connected graph G if the vertices of G can be partitioned into |V (H)| non-empty connected subgraphs such that if (u, v) is an edge of H then there exists an edge of G with one endpoint in the subgraph corresponding to u and one endpoint in the subgraph corresponding to v. Robertson and Seymour [1986] proved that every graph of treewidth k admits a grid minor of size f (k), that is, the f (k) × f (k) grid is a minor of every graph of treewidth at least k. Their bound f was improved several times over the years, but only recently was a polynomial bound obtained by Chekuri and Chuzhoy [2014] . They prove that there exist c and δ > 0 such that every graph G has a grid minor of size at least c · ω(G) δ . Since τ (G) ≤ 2ω(G) by Theorem 2.3, this implies that there exist c and δ such that every graph has a grid minor of size c · τ (G)
δ . Now, before completing the proof of Theorem 5.1, let us learn more about the dual integrality gap of grids.
LEMMA 5.2. The dual integrality gap of an n × n grid R n satisfies
PROOF. Take the grid R n and define a thicket H = {H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H n } as follows. The set H i is the set of vertices in the ith row or in the ith column. Thus each H i is viable, and H i and H j intersect at two vertices in the grid -namely, the vertices with grid coordinates (i, j) and (j, i). We create a simple game G over the grid R n by assigning value one to those coalitions in H. Clearly ρ(G) = 1 as the sets in H are pairwise intersecting. On the other hand, ρ f (G) ≥ 1 2 n = 1 2 τ (R n ). This is easy to see because we may assign a fractional value of 1 2 to each set in H. Every grid vertex is in exactly two sets of H, so this is a valid fractional packing.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 5.1.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1. Let G be a graph of vinewidth ν(G) = τ (G). We may assume that G is connected. By [Chekuri and Chuzhoy 2014] , there exist c and δ such that G admits a grid minor R k of size at least k = c·τ (G) δ . We wish to apply Lemma 5.2 to show the existence of a game with dual integrality gap at least 1 2 k. We define the thicket H = {H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H k } as before, except now each node in the grid minor R k corresponds to a connected subgraph of the original graph G. Formally, denote by u i,j the vertices of the grid of size k × k (where i refers to the row and j to the column of the vertex u i,j ) and by X i,j the connected subset of G which is assigned to u i,j . For every i ≤ k, let H i = k j=1 X i,j ∪ k j=1 X j,i . The coalition H i is viable by the definition of a minor. Again, we take the simple game G where only the coalitions in H are given value 1. For every i = j, the sets H i and H j intersect since both Y i ∩ Y j = X i,j ∪ X j,i . Thus ρ(G) = 1 and ρ f (G) ≥ k 2 . Of course, any subsequent improvement in the polynomial function of [Chekuri and Chuzhoy 2014] will give an improved lower bound for 5.1. Nonetheless, this grid-minor method cannot provide a linear lower bound as [Bachrach et al. 2009a] and [Meir et al. 2010] proved the following result: LEMMA 5.3. The dual integrality gap of the clique K n satisfies
THE PRIMAL INTEGRALITY GAP
To conclude, we consider the primal integrality gap. This measures the maximum ratio in the cost between paying the agents in integral amounts and paying in fractional amounts. Our first result is that the thicket number does quantify the primal integrality gap to within a constant factor, namely Theorem 1.2. The upper bound follows from Theorem 1.1, so it suffices to show the lower bound. (Due to space considerations, all the proofs for this section are deferred to the full paper.) THEOREM 6.1. For any interaction graph G, the primal integrality gap satisfies:
So the primal integrality gap (for the worst game) is within a factor 4 for any pair of interaction graphs with the same thicket number. Recall that the packing-covering ratio is the same (for the worst game) for every pair of interaction graphs with the same thicket number by Theorem 1.1. Is this also the case for the primal integrality gap? The answer is no. There are graphs whose primal integrality gaps differ. In particular we will show that the integrality gap for a clique is equal to 1 2 τ (G), up to an additive constant, whereas the class of graphs that are "powers of a path" have integrality gaps that tend to τ (G). Consider first the class of cliques.
LEMMA 6.2. Let G = K n be a clique on n vertices. Then the primal integrality gap of K n satisfies
Next consider the power graphs of a path. Let P be a path on n vertices. The r-th power of P , denoted by G = P r , is formed by connecting any pair of vertices whose distance is at most r in P . THEOREM 6.3. Let G = P r be the r-th power of a path on n vertices where n ≥ 3r. Then τ (G) = r and, provided n ≥ k 2 (r + 1), the primal integrality gap satisfies
Theorem 6.3 ensures that the constant 1 in the upper bound of Theorem 1.2 cannot be improved. However, as observed in Lemma 6.2, this upper bound cannot be reached for every graph as there are graphs where the primal integrality gap is upper bounded by around half the vinewidth.
